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Abstract 
 
 Party activists face a coordination problem: a critical mass (a barrier to 
coordination) must advocate a single policy alternative if the party is to 
succeed.  The need for direction is the degree to which the merits of the 
alternatives respond to the underlying mood of the party. An individual’s 
ability to assess the mood is his sense of direction. These factors combine to 
form an index of both the desirability and the feasibility of leadership: we 
call this index Michels’ Ratio. A sovereign party conference gives way to 
leadership by an individual or oligarchy if and only if Michels’ Ratio is 
sufficiently high. Leadership enhances the clarity of intra-party 
communication, but weakens the response of policy choices to the party’s 
mood. 
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2In her recent Presidential Address to the American Political Science Association, Margaret
Levi (2006) called for a new theory of government. A central ingredient in her proposed
recipe was leadership; she argued (p. 13) that “human agency, through leadership, be-
lief reformation, preference formation, and widespread constituent support, provides the
yeast, the missing ingredient of a dynamic theory of effective government.” Few would
deny that leadership is an essential feature of political organization, and yet (Levi, 2006,
p. 11) “still lacking is a model of the origins and means of ensuring good leadership.”
We take a small step in response to Levi’s call. Building on her suggestion that (p. 10)
“leadership—both of government and within civil society—provides the agency that co-
ordinates the efforts of others” we develop a formal model in which the direction pro-
vided by leadership helps to coordinate the actions of a mass. We ask: is such direction
best provided by one, a few, or the many? These institutional forms correspond to de
facto dictatorship, oligarchy, and pure democracy. While an answer to this first question
reveals the relative desirability of these institutional forms, we must also consider their
feasibility: when will members of a democratic body voluntarily follow the lead taken by
either a single individual or an elite subset of their membership?
The “Iron Law of Oligarchy” emerging from Michels’ (1915) study of labor movements
and political parties offers unequivocal answers to these two questions. Michels realized
that success might require the effective coordination of an activist base, arguing that the
“importance and influence of the working class are directly proportional to
its numerical strength. But for the representation of that numerical strength
organization and coordination are indispensable.” (Michels, 1915, p. 19)
This view stemmed fromMichels’ study of the German Socialist Party.2 Whilst nominally
adhering to the principle of conference sovereignty, key decisions were taken within the
party’s fraktionmeetings; conference rallied behind its leadership. Michels’ argued that an
activist mass would voluntarily renounce its democratic rights and defer to an oligarchy.3
To provide our own answers, we model the coordination problem faced by an activist
mass; this is a stylized representation of a party’s membership. Specifically, each party
member must advocate one of two policy alternatives A and B. A policy succeeds if and
only if a critical fraction of the party (we call this a barrier to coordination) supports it; an
2The Socialist Party was a forerunner of the German Social Democratic Party. It helped to provide political
organization to the largest mass labor movement in 19th century Europe. For an application of Michels’
work to British political parties see McKenzie (1963), and for a critical review see Hands (1971).
3Moving further, Michels claimed that elites develop to pursue goals that betray the original movement.
Modern interpretations have highlighted the similarities between this dynamic and the process of agency
drift. This being so, some have suggested that ex ante control mechanisms can counteract the tendency
of leadership to drift (Lupia and McCubbins, 2000). Koelble (1996), for example, in using the arguments
from the literature on Congress, suggested that “party activists prefer strict monitoring of the actions of
the representatives, mechanisms for screening and selection which force the agent to report and act as
delegate rather than as a trustee for the party.” We do not address the agency issue, focusing instead on the
conditions under which the sovereignty of party conference will give way to a leadership elite.
3uncoordinated party splits and fails. Partymembers would like the best policy to succeed.
A stylized interpretation of the mid-1990s reform of the British Labour party helps to fix
ideas. Policy Awould be the adoption of Tony Blair’s “New Labour” program, while the
alternative policy B would be the retention of “old” Labour ideals. Whatever the merits
of these alternatives, a unified party could challenge for power; in contrast, a split may
well have relegated the party to another term in the wilderness.
Given their common objective, one mode of behavior seems obvious: all activists should
advocate the best policy. This is difficult when the identity of the “best policy” is uncer-
tain. This will be so when the merits of policies depend upon the political situation in
which the party operates, since party members’ assessment of this situation may differ.
Here leadership may help since, as Levi (2006) suggested, “leadership . . . provides the
learning environment that enables individuals to transform or revise beliefs.” However,
other institutions, such as a party conference, might also provide a learning environment.
Institutions differ in how they allow actors to achieve a common understanding. The need
for such an understanding is most pressing when the merits of policies react strongly to
the underlying situation; that is, when there is a strong need for direction.
It is instructive to begin with an environment in which leadership is absent. We imag-
ine activists gathering to discuss policy. At such a conference, an activist attends meet-
ings, listens to opinions, engages in conversations, and eavesdrops on others: he receives
a private signal of the party’s mood, and the signal’s precision is his sense of direction.
Differences in signal realizations (different activists hear different things) can generate
disagreement over the desirability of policies. So, whilst a conference helps to provide di-
rection, the private nature of opinion formation can prevent party members from forming
a common view of the party’s goals; there is a lack of clarity in the party’s communication.
Formally, the conference leads to a game played by party members. An activist bases his
action (A or B) on his assessment (a private signal) of the party’s mood. Contemplating
his decision, the activist will recognize that his advocacy counts only when he is pivotal to
a policy’s success. Conditional on his information, he will consider the relative likelihood
of his pivotality for policy A versus policy B. As his assessment moves in favor of A, this
relative likelihood grows. His optimal strategy will be a threshold rule: advocateA rather
than B if and only if the perceived mood of the party is sufficiently favorable to A. We
identify a unique equilibrium in which all party members use the same threshold rule.
An advantage of the conference is that the actions of the mass respond to the need for
direction. When policy A is far more desirable than B, the aggregate mood of the party
will reflect this. Activists’ assessment of this mood will point toward A, and so (given the
threshold rule) policy Awill succeed. A disadvantage is that the party may fail to coordi-
nate. If the policies are evenly matched, so that there is a mood of indifference throughout
the party, then the private signals of different activists may well point in different direc-
tions. When activists advocate different policies the party splits.
4Given that a split is undesirable, can party members coordinate on the same policy ir-
respective of its merits? For instance, they might all back policy B unless their private
signals reveal that policy A is extremely desirable. Such a bias toward B might be self-
reinforcing; an activist will reason that should he be pivotal to the success of a policy, then
he is more likely to be pivotal for B. We refer to this effect as positive feedback.
This is not, however, the only effect we need to consider. When activists are biased toward
B, the support for policy A achieves the critical mass required for success only if its true
merits are exceptional. Contemplating this, an individual activist realizes that if he is
pivotal to the success of A, then policy A must have a critical mass of support, and so
must be extremely desirable. Thus, conditional on his pivotality (the situation in which
advocacy matters) an individual activist has a strong preference for A. This negative-
feedback effect is analogous to the swing voter’s curse of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996): an activist’s curse prompts a switch away from policies to which others are biased.
The activist’s curse also moves the party away from safe policies. Suppose that A repre-
sents a dramatic shift from the status quo, so that a greater fraction of the party needs to
coordinate if radical reform is to succeed; it is more ambitious, since it must vault a high
barrier to coordination. Recycling the logic above, an activist can be pivotal for A only
when its merits are very strong, since only then will party-wide support for A achieve a
critical mass. Once again, conditional on his pivotality, an individual will have a prefer-
ence for A. The implication is that activists will pursue lofty goals with extra zeal.
Bringing these observations together, a conference is desirable because it aggregates the
opinions of party members and so successful policies respond to the need for direction.
Nevertheless, it brings the risk of mis-coordination, and the activist’s curse biases party
members toward ambitious goals. In some circumstances, then, dissatisfactionmight lead
to what Michels (1915, pp. 35–41) described as a “need for leadership felt by the mass.”
If a leader could dictate the policy choice, then mis-coordination might be avoided. The
penalty would be that the leader might not reflect the true mood of the party. To assess
the need for leadership, then, we pose the following question: if a leading activist could
choose between (i) choosing the policy herself, and (ii) allowing the policy to emerge from
a party conference, then what would she do?
The answer incorporates three factors. Firstly, a policy’s success requires a critical mass of
support. The sum of the critical-mass measures for the alternatives indexes the barriers
to coordination. Secondly, the strength of the relationship between the policies’ merits
and the true underlying party mood indexes the need for direction. Finally, the ability to
discover the best policy relies upon the accuracy of an activist’s assessment of the party
mood. This accuracy is an individual’s sense of direction. Our analysis reveals that it is
natural to combine these three elements into a single measure R. We call itMichels’ Ratio:
R =
Barriers to Coordination× Sense of Direction
Need for Direction
.
5We find that a leading party member would prefer to dictate policy if and only if Michels’
Ratio is sufficiently large. Direct choice by the leader is desirable when barriers to coor-
dination are high because the risk of mis-coordination is large. She is better able to select
the best policy when her sense of direction is particularly sharp. However, when the need
for direction is particularly pressing (so that the policies’ merits depend strongly on the
party’s mood) then conference becomes more desirable, precisely because its outcome
reflects the party’s mood. Drawing these elements together, we show that the criterion
for the mass desirability of leadership is R > 1. When this holds all party members are
dissatisfied with the conference: each would prefer to dictate policy in a leadership role.
When R < 1 the desire to dictate is felt only by some. The activists who are content
with the outcome of a conference and the risk of mis-coordination that this entails are
“moderates” in the sense that their signals fail to identify clearly the best policy: they
are unsure of the right thing to do. By contrast, those with signals that point decisively
toward one of the policies retain a desire to lead. They are “extremists” not because of
their preferences, but because of their confidence in assessing the party’s mood.
Understanding the roles played by barriers to coordination, the need for direction, and
partymembers’ sense of the underlying partymood helps us to determine the desirability
of leadership. But when is leadership feasible? To address this question, suppose that a
leader stands up and makes a speech which is heard by all of the party, and so commonly
communicates her views to the party mass. Activists can now draw upon two sources of
information when forming their assessment of the party’s mood: firstly, a private signal
emerging from conference; and secondly, a public signal from the leader’s speech.
Suppose that the speech favors policyA. This will lead an activist to reappraise positively
his opinion of the party mood with regard to A, and so increases the likelihood that if
he is pivotal then he is pivotal for A. Contemplating this, he realizes that since others
hear the same speech, they too will begin to move toward A and away from B. This
reinforces his bias toward A: a bandwagon begins to roll. However, a second force—
the activist’s curse—slows this bandwagon. When the positive feedback sparked by the
speech overcomes the negative feedback from the activist’s curse, the bandwagon rolls
on until all support for policy B evaporates.
Positive feedback is related to the information content of the leader’s speech which is de-
termined, in turn, by her sense of direction. Furthermore, the relative likelihood of pivotal
events responds strongly to activists’ assessments of the party mood when these events
are (heuristically) far apart. This is so when the barriers to coordination are high. On the
other hand, the activist’s curse is large when the merits of the policies depend heavily
on swings in the party’s mood; that is, when the need for direction is pressing. Bringing
these factors together we find that positive-feedback dominates negative-feedback if and
only if R > 1. In summary, the leader’s speech fully coordinates the party mass when
Michels’ Ratio is sufficiently large; this is precisely the criterion that generates the need
6for leadership felt by the mass. Put simply, leadership that fully coordinates the party is
feasible if and only if it is desired by the mass.
If R < 1 then while the party is not susceptible to leadership by an individual, it may
defer to an oligarchy. Suppose that an elite of k party members successfully share their
assessments of the party’s mood, and hence reach a common view. If a representative is
able to communicate perfectly the elite’s view, then party members will hear a speech of
greater precision; the speech conveys a better sense of direction. By pooling information,
the elite enhances the positive-feedback effect, and full coordination is feasible. Our anal-
ysis reveals that an elite of k party members is able to do this if and only if k ×R > 1: the
minimum feasible size of a de facto oligarchy is inversely related to Michels’ Ratio.
Following a brief literature review, we describe the coordination problem faced by party
members. We then characterize behavior in a leaderless world, where decisions are based
on information arising from a stylized party conference. Our study of the role of leader-
ship is in three steps: firstly, we assess the need for leadership; secondly, we investigate
the feasibility of successful leadership; and finally we consider leadership by an elite.
RELATED LITERATURE
Before proceeding to construct the model of activism and leadership that underpins our
arguments, we first review a small selection of the literature upon which we build.
Party activists play a global game (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993); following Morris and
Shin (2003), it is a game “of incomplete information whose type space is determined by
the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state.” Here, the “underlying
state” is the party’s mood and the “noisy signal” includes information gleaned from other
party members (a private signal) or from a leader’s speech (a public signal). Economists
have used global games to model many phenomena, including currency crises (Morris
and Shin, 1998), bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), and debt pricing (Morris and
Shin, 2004). However, the approach has seen little use in political science.
We also build upon Myatt’s (2006) analysis of strategic voting in plurality-rule three-
candidate elections. He explored the properties of a stable voting equilibriumwith multi-
candidate support, contrasting with the “Duvergerian” equilibria in previous studies
(Cox, 1994, 1997; Palfrey, 1989; Myerson and Weber, 1993). Whereas in those earlier mod-
els voters commonly understand the electoral situation, Myatt’s voters base their deci-
sions on private signals. Since signals may point in different directions all candidates
receive votes in equilibrium, and so supporters of two candidates who share a dislike of a
third candidate fail to fully coordinate their actions. This feature is present in our model,
since differences in private signal realizations generate a risk of mis-coordination. The
key difference between the two papers is this: in Myatt’s model voters know their own
7preferences, but preferences differ across the electorate; in ours, party members share the
same preferences but must use signals to identify the policies’ merits.
The emergence of a leader corresponds to the introduction of a commonly observed pub-
lic signal of the party’s mood. For this reason, our paper relates directly to the work of
Morris and Shin (2002) and subsequent debates (Angeletos and Pavan, 2004; Svensson,
2006; Morris, Shin, and Tong, 2006). They considered the welfare effects of enhanced
dissemination of public information in the context of a coordination game.
Finally, some insights stem from the literature on information aggregation. A negative-
feedback effect was central to the work of Feddersen (1992) and Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer (1997, 1998). For example, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) showed that the unanim-
ity of jury verdicts can increase the likelihood of a conviction irrespective of the true state
of the world: when a juror is pivotal in securing a conviction under unanimity, he will put
less emphasis on his own private information than onwhat must be true given that others
are making informed decisions. A similar effect exists here: a high barrier to coordination
for one of the policies leads activists to move toward it.
COORDINATING ACTIVISM
The setting for our analysis is a simultaneous-move binary-action common-interest game
in which party activists must decide which of two policy platforms to advocate. Since
the players share common payoffs, the game lacks the tension between private and social
interests that is central to the view of collective action popularized by Olson (1965). Nev-
ertheless, the actors face a collective-action problem in a different sense: a critical mass
must coordinate on one of the policies if that platform is to be successfully adopted by
their party. Failure to coordinate results in a party split, and subsequent electoral failure.
The Game. Formally, n party activists simultaneously decide to support either platform
A or platform B. We imagine n to be large, so that the player set is either the entire party
membership or a large and representative subset of them. We write x for the total number
of activists who advocate platform A, so that n− x back B. The actions combine to yield
one of three outcomes: (i) policy A succeeds; (ii) policy B succeeds; or (iii) the party is
split, and fails to move forward. For two fractions pA and pB satisfying 1 > pA > pB > 0,
Outcome =

Platform A if x
n
> pA,
Failure if pA ≥ xn ≥ pB, and
Platform B if pB > xn .
pA represents the coordination required for the success ofA, and 1−pB is the coordination
required for B. We think of situations in which a 50 : 50 party split would lead to failure;
8this corresponds to the restriction pA > 12 > pB.
4 For later use, we define indices piA and
piB which measure the severity of the coordination problem. Writing Φ(·) for the cumu-
lative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, the barrier to coordination
for platform A is a parameter piA > 0 satisfying pA = Φ(piA). Similarly, the barrier to coor-
dination piB > 0 for policy B satisfies pB = 1 − Φ(piB). Platform A is a more challenging
policy option than platform B whenever piA− piB > 0, and so piA− piB indexes the relative
height of the barriers to coordination. Their aggregate height is the sum piA + piB. These
expressions, piA − piB and piA + piB, feature prominently in our formal results.
Our stylized description of mid-1990s British Labour Party reform illustrates our specifi-
cation: Platform A is the “New Labour” agenda, and B represents “old” Labour; a split
means another term in the wilderness. Given that B is some kind of status quo, we might
expect piA−piB > 0; contentious aspects of the New Labour agenda require greater unity.5
Payoffs. The party activists, who share common interests, care only about the outcome.
A failure to coordinate is undesirable, and so generates a zero payoff to everyone, whereas
successful coordination yields a strictly positive payoff.6 For some uA > 0 and uB > 0,
Common Payoff =

uA if xn > pA,
0 if pA ≥ xn ≥ pB, and
uB if pB > xn .
Since they share common interests, all players would like to coordinate on the best policy.
Nevertheless, when information is complete there aremanyNash equilibria. For instance,
there is an equilibrium in which everyone backs A (so that x = n) and an equilibrium in
which everyone backs B (so that x = 0). There are many other pure-strategy equilibria:
any pattern of support where no individual is pivotal is an equilibrium.7
These equilibria include play where the party is split, and others where it succeeds. De-
spite this multiplicity, one equilibrium seems focal: if uA > uB, then surely everyone
4This restriction, which helps to simplify the exposition, is imposed throughout. However, the formal
results continue to hold when either 1 > pA > pB > 12 or
1
2 > pA > pB > 0.
5The case pA > 1− pB is illustrated in Figure 1(b). If frustration with old Labour failings means that greater
consensus is needed to retain existing policies, then the appropriate specification might be pA < 1− pB .
6Each activist must choose to back one of the policies; indifferent abstention is disallowed. However, given
that mis-coordination is possible and everyone strictly dislikes failure, abstention from participation is a
(weakly) dominated strategy. This contrasts with the work of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). They
studied a world in which either A or B always wins, and found a strict incentive for abstention.
7The two pure-strategy profiles which are not equilibria correspond to values of x satisfying
x+ 1
n
> pA ≥ x
n
or
x
n
≥ pB > x− 1
n
.
For instance, in the first situation a player who chooses B could switch to A, avoiding a failure and hence
yielding a payoff gain of uA. Such pivotal situations are exceptional, since other values of x (where no
individual can affect the outcome) yield a pure-strategyNash equilibrium. We could, of course, characterize
mixed-strategy equilibria but this would only expand the embarrassment of riches.
9should coordinate on policy A? Alas, this can only be obvious when it is common knowl-
edge that uA > uB. If not, then an activist might worry that others think (or even suspect
that others worry that he thinks) that uB < uA. In short, an analysis based on a complete-
information game relies heavily on a common understanding of the policies’ merits.
A Need For Policy Direction. To move further, we build a richer game in which the de-
sirability of the policies is uncertain. In the context of a pure-strategy equilibrium players
may entertain the possibility of pivotal events in which they may play a part.
Formally, the payoffs uA(θ) and uB(θ) depend upon an underlying (and ex ante uncertain)
real-valued state variable θ. We assume that uA(θ) is increasing, and uB(θ) is decreasing,
so that an increase in θ favors the desirability of A relative to B. The state variable θ
represents the underlying political situation; it could depend on socioeconomic variables,
the preferences of an electorate, or the evolving ideology of the party membership at
large. We refer to it as the mood of the party. The congruence of policies with the party
mood will then determine their desirability. When policy preferences respond strongly
to mood, then there is a pressing need for direction, since the merits of a platform depend
heavily on the value taken by θ. We use a parameter λ > 0 to index this need for direction,
and we adopt the following specification:
uA(θ) = exp
[
λθ
2
]
and uB(θ) = exp
[
−λθ
2
]
.
Figure 1(a) illustrates. When θ is zero an activist is indifferent between the two policies.
As the mood swings to the right then the payoff from platform A relative to platform B
grows. It is convenient to express the payoffs in terms of log relative preference:
log
[
uA
uB
]
= λ× θ where
λ = need for direction, andθ = mood of the party.
Of course, the log relative preference for A over B could be a general increasing function
of the party mood; our specification is a linear approximation to such a relationship.
The party mood θ is unknown, and so activists must use any informative signals at their
disposal to form beliefs about it. If choices depend on such signals, then they will also
depend on the realization of θ. Hence an activist must contemplate the party mood for
two reasons: firstly, he must assess the merits of the policies; and, secondly, he must
consider the likelihood of pivotal events in which his advocacy makes a difference.
Optimal Activism. Whereas an analysis of our game requires us to specify the signals
via which activists assess the party mood, we pause to discuss optimal behavior. An
activist’s choice is relevant only when he is pivotal. For instance, he is pivotal for policy A
(PA is shorthand for this event) when support for A is one step short of pA. Similarly, PB
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(b) The Coordination Problem
Panel (a) illustrates the relationship between the underlying political situation and
the payoffs from successful coordination. For the particular value of θ = 1 high-
lighted, we see that uA(θ)uB(θ) = 2, and so (if only they knew the party’s true mood)
activists would wish to coordinate on platform A. Panel (b) illustrates the barri-
ers to coordination faced by activists. In this case, pA > 1 − pB , and hence policy
platform Amight be described as a “loftier” goal. When the proportion of activists
supporting A falls into the central region, the party splits and fails.
FIGURE 1. Coordinating Activism
is the situation in which the activist is pivotal for policy B. If choices respond to signal
realizations, then these two pivotal events will have positive probability.
If an activist is pivotal for A then his support for A yields a payoff of uA(θ). Of course,
θ is uncertain, and his expected payoff is E[uA(θ) | PA]. Notice that the merits of policy A
are conditional on the pivotal event PA. This event happens with probability Pr[PA], and
so the net payoff from backing A is Pr[PA] × E[uA(θ) | PA]. Similarly, the net payoff from
backing B is Pr[PB]× E[uB(θ) | PB]. It is strictly optimal to support A if and only if
Pr[PA] E[uA(θ) | PA] > Pr[PB] E[uB(θ) | PB],
noting that the probabilities and expectations are also conditional on any other informa-
tion available to an activist. This criterion may be conveniently re-written as
Choose A ⇐⇒ log Pr[PA]
Pr[PB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) relative likelihood
+ log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) relative conditional preference
> 0. (?)
Hence the activist optimally balances (i) the relative likelihood of his pivotality for A
versus B; and (ii) his relative preference for the two policies, where this preference is
evaluated conditional on his pivotality in each of the two cases.
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THE PARTY CONFERENCE
We first study behavior in a leaderless world. We find a unique equilibrium in which
activists respond to privately observed signals of the party’s underlying mood.
Intra-Party Communication. A “party conference” is a metaphor for intra-party discus-
sion of the underlying political situation. While discussion might occur in a variety of
settings, we think of a large conference meeting. An activist gains (via meetings, conver-
sations, and eavesdropping) a feel for the mood of the party; he receives a private signal
of this mood. If the conference is representative of the wider party membership, then
signals will be correct on average. Thus, if party members could pool their information
then they would discover the true party mood and hence the correct policy platform.8
Unfortunately, signals differ: an activist who attends fringe meetings may get a different
sense of the party mood than an activist who spends his time in the conference bar. This is
likely to be important since, as an activist wanders around conference, he will ask himself
whether others share his sense of the direction in which the party is going.
A Sense of Direction. Activists begin with no knowledge of the party mood; they have
uniform (improper) priors over θ. Activist i ∈ {1, 2, . . .} then sees a private signal, where
conditional on the party mood signals are identically and independently distributed:9
mi | θ ∼ N
(
θ,
1
ψ
)
where
θ = mood of the party, andψ = sense of direction.
Hence a signal is equal to the true party mood plus normal noise. ψ is the inverse of
the variance of this noise, and so indexes the signal’s precision: it is an activist’s sense of
direction. Conditional on his signal, his updated beliefs satisfy θ |mi ∼ N (mi, [1/ψ]).
Thresholds. We consider a natural class of strategies in which choices react positively to
signals: an activist operates a threshold rule if he backs A rather than B if and only if his
assessment of the party mood exceeds some thresholdm. Equivalently
Choose A ⇐⇒ mi > m,
and so he chooses B if mi < m.10 Allowing the threshold to take values m ∈ {−∞,∞},
the class of threshold strategies includes those where an activist ignores his private signal
and always advocates A (corresponding tom = −∞) or always advocates B (form =∞).
However, for any real-valued threshold, actions respond to signals in a non-trivial way.
Definition. Whenm takes on a finite real value, a threshold rule is signal responsive.
8Our results extend immediately to a setting in which the aggregate mood of the party conference imper-
fectly reflects the wider political situation and so fails to capture fully the merits of the policy alternatives.
9Our results extend easily to environments in which the activists’ signals are conditionally correlated.
10All results hold for any tie-break rule adopted for the (measure zero) case wheremi = m.
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This figure illustrates the relationship between the party mood θ and the support p
for policy A (the support for B is 1− p) when activists use the threshold rule:
Choose A ⇐⇒ mi > m.
When θ = m, the party is 50 : 50 split between the platforms. For A to succeed, the
party mood needs to swing right to θ > θA, and for B to succeed the mood must
swing left to θ < θB . The mood is indecisive when θA < θ < θB . Observe that
θA − θB = piA + piB√
ψ
,
and so the “zone of mis-coordination” for an indecisive party mood increases with
the barriers to coordination but decreases with activists’ sense of direction.
FIGURE 2. Critical Moods of the Party
Conditional on the party mood, an activist backs A with probability p ≡ Pr[mi > m | θ].
Writing Φ(·) for the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, this proba-
bility satisfies p = Φ
[√
ψ(θ −m)]. Clearly, support for A increases as θ grows, so that the
party’s mood swings to the right. It is also decreasing in the threshold used by activists:
a reduction inm yields a move toward platform A and away from platform B.
Whereas we call p the “support” for platform A, the actual fraction of activists who ad-
vocate A is x
n
. However, if attendance at the conference is large, so that n → ∞, then the
Law of Large Numbers ensures that this fraction will almost always be close to p.
Party Success and Failure. Given that the party membership is large, policy A will suc-
ceed if and only if p > pA. Equivalently, it succeeds if and only if the true party mood
exceeds θA, where θA is the critical value that satisfies pA = Φ
[√
ψ(θA −m)
]
; similarly, B
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succeeds if and only if θ < θB where pB = Φ
[√
ψ(θB −m)
]
. Summarizing,
Outcome =

Platform A if θ > θA,
Failure if θA ≥ θ ≥ θB,
Platform B if θB > θ,
where
θA = m+ piA√ψ , andθB = m− piB√ψ ,
where we have used our indices of the barriers to coordination piA ≡ Φ−1(piA) and piB ≡
Φ−1(1− pB). The two critical party moods, θA and θB, partition the range of party moods
into three segments according to the outcome. Figure 2 provides an illustration.
We make two observations. Firstly, when activists use a threshold m they react to their
assessments and so policy responds to the party mood. Secondly, such strategies bring
the risk of mis-coordination: when θA > θ > θB the party’s mood (relative to the threshold
m) is one of indifference and the party fails. The size of this “zone of mis-coordination”
is determined by (piA + piB)/
√
ψ, and so is increasing with the combined height of the
barriers to coordination but is decreasing in activists’ sense of direction.
We now turn our gaze away from the conference at large and back to an individual’s de-
cision. He will use his signal to assess the party mood and hence (i) the relative likelihood
of his pivotality for A versus B, and (ii) his relative preference for A versus B. We study
these two factors in turn, before characterizing behavior in equilibrium.
Relative Likelihood. When the party conference is large, and others adopt a threshold
m, the support for pwill be determined by θ. An activist will realize that he can be pivotal
for A only when θ ≈ θA, and pivotal for B only when θ ≈ θB. Thus, conditional on his
private signalmi, activist iwill compute the relative likelihood of θA versus θB. Given that
his posterior beliefs are normally distributed aroundmi with precision ψ, the log relative
likelihood takes a particulary simple form, as the following lemma confirms. (The proofs
to this lemma and our other formal results are contained in the technical appendix.)
Lemma 1. Fixing a thresholdm used by other members of the party, and conditional on the private
signalmi of activist i, the log relative likelihood of being pivotal for A versus B satisfies
log
Pr[PA]
Pr[PB] −→ (piA + piB)
√
ψ × (mi −m) as n→∞.
This is increasing in the activist’s private assessment of the party mood, and decreasing in the
threshold used by others. The size of the relative-likelihood effect increases with the barriers to
coordination and an activist’s sense of direction, but is unaffected by the need for direction.
When assessing the likelihood of pivotal events, the activist judges the party mood rela-
tive to the threshold used by others. As he perceives a swing to the right (that is, a rise in
θ) it is more likely that if he is pivotal then he will be pivotal forA. This response depends
not only on his sense of direction, but also on the height of the barriers to coordination.
As illustrated in Figure 2, as piA and piB grow the zone of mis-coordination widens. This
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implies that the two critical moods, θA and θB, move further apart and so are easier to
distinguish. This being so, an activist can more readily ascertain which of the two critical
events (whether he is pivotal for A or for B) is more likely.11
Lemma 1 also reveals a positive-feedback effect. As others bias toward A (a fall inm) the
log likelihood ratio grows, which pushes activist i toward advocacy of A. This suggests a
positive bandwagon: if an activist believes that others will bias toward a policy, then he
will be tempted to follow them. This is not the whole story, however, since we must also
consider the activist’s relative preference (conditional on his pivotality) for A versus B.
Relative Preference. When contemplating the policies’ merits, an activist considers his
strategic environment. He recognizes that the payoff from policyA only matters when his
action is critical to its success. Thus, he cares about the expected payoff fromAwhen he is
pivotal: this is E[uA(θ) | PA]. When the party is large he is pivotal only when θ ≈ θA, and
hence E[uA(θ) | PA] −→ u(θA) as n → ∞. Considering the behavior of others, the activist
canwork out what is true of the world (that is, the underlying partymood) when a pivotal
event occurs. This means that the precise realization of his private signal does not matter.
Similar considerations for the payoff from policy B lead to the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Fixing a thresholdm, the log relative conditional preference for A over B satisfies
log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB] −→ λ
[
m+
piA − piB
2
√
ψ
]
as n→∞.
This relative preference forA increases with the bias of others towardB and with the relative height
of the barriers to coordination. The size of the second effect decreases with an activist’s sense of
direction, and the size of both effects increases with the overall need for direction.
Lemma 2 reveals a negative-feedback effect: as others lean toward A (a fall in the thresh-
old m) then the relative preference for A falls, which (cf. Lemma 1) pushes an activist
toward B. Similarly, when A is easy to achieve, in the sense of having a lower barrier to
coordination, an activist swings against it: he is relatively keen to pursue lofty goals. Bor-
rowing the “swing voter’s curse” terminology from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996),
we bring these effects under the umbrella of the activist’s curse.
This curse bites whenever the odds are stacked against a policy. If B is hard to achieve,
or if others are biased toward A, then, on reflection, B can only win when the party
mood leans strongly to the left and hence θ is low. This implies that if B is on the verge
of success then, since other factors work against B, the mood of the party must heavily
favor it; the policy must be extremely desirable. Notice that (much like the winner’s curse
of auction theory) the activist contemplates what must be true about the world given the
situation in which he finds himself, namely that he is pivotal. The implications of such
11The need for direction does not enter Lemma 1. This is because the activist considers only the likelihood
of PA and PB ; the need for direction comes into play only when an activist considers the policies’ merits.
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considerations depend upon the strength of the connection between the policies’ payoffs
and the underlying state of the world; this is simply the need for direction λ.
Equilibrium. Lemmas 1–2 characterize the effect of a threshold strategy deployed by the
partymembership on the incentives of an individual activist. We now seek an equilibrium
of our party-conference game within the class of threshold strategies.
Definition. A threshold equilibrium is a threshold rule “advocate platform A ⇔ mi > m∗”
such that when all other party members use it: (i) an activist with a signal mi > m∗ finds it
optimal to back policy A when the party size is sufficiently large; and (ii) an activist with a signal
mi < m
∗ finds it optimal to back policy B when the party size is sufficiently large.
Two threshold equilibria are the fully coordinated threshold rules with m∗ = ∞ and
m∗ = −∞. For instance, when party members use the thresholdm∗ = −∞ they all ignore
the realization of their private signals and back policy A. Given that they do this, the
pivotal events PA and PB never happen, and so actions are (trivially) optimal.
In contrast, when an equilibrium threshold m∗ takes a real value, decisions respond to
signal realizations. For such a signal-responsive equilibrium the outcome is uncertain
and so the events PA and PB occur with positive probability.
A threshold m∗ forms a signal-responsive equilibrium when, in a large party, an activist
with a private signal mi = m∗ is indifferent between the alternatives. Assembling the
relative-likelihood and relative-preference effects,
mi = m
∗ =⇒ lim
n→∞
[
log
Pr[PA]
Pr[PB] + log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB]
]
= 0.
Inspecting Lemma 1, when mi = m∗ the relative-likelihood effect disappears. Given that
a private signal is equal to the threshold used by others, PA and PB are equally likely in a
large party: formally, log[Pr[PA]/Pr[PB]]→ 0 as n→∞. This means that the equilibrium
threshold m∗ is tied down by the relative preference term from Lemma 2, which must
equal zero. This term is increasing in the difference between the barriers to coordination
piA and piB, so that there is a preference bias toward policy Awhenever A is more difficult
to achieve ( that is piA > piB). The equilibrium threshold m∗ must, therefore, offset this
effect. Setting the relative preference to zero, and solving form∗ we obtain the next result.
Proposition 1. There is a unique signal-responsive threshold equilibrium, with threshold
m∗ =
piB − piA
2
√
ψ
.
There is a bias toward policy A if and only if its barrier to coordination is higher. The size of the
bias |m∗| decreases with the sense of direction ψ, and is invariant to the need for coordination λ.
One might think that an exogenous increase in piA makes a success for policy A less likely.
However, there is an endogenous reaction: in equilibrium activists are biased in their
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advocacy toward a policy that is more difficult to achieve; they are enthusiastic in their
pursuit of lofty goals. Using our expressions for θA and θB, and substituting form∗,
θA =
piA + piB
2
√
ψ
and θB = −piA + piB
2
√
ψ
,
so that the zone of mis-coordination is a symmetric interval around zero. If piA > piB, for
instance, then the endogenous equilibrium bias toward A precisely offsets the exogenous
bias toward B. Turning attention back to Figure 2, the political outcome (A, B, or failure)
depends only upon the location of the zone of mis-coordination which, in turn, depends
only on the aggregate height of the barriers to coordination. If we were to raise the barrier
faced by one policy, while lowering the other, then this zone would not move. The im-
portant point to be made here is that a key feature of the institutional backdrop, namely
that some policies require greater consensus, does not influence policy.
Two further features are worthy of note. Firstly, a signal-responsive threshold ensures
that policy choices react to the party mood and so favors the use of a conference as a
central institutional mechanism for aggregating opinions. Secondly, there is a risk of mis-
coordination: the party fails when θA > θ > θB. Note, however, that the relative impor-
tance of these effects depends on the need for direction and yet, despite this, λ plays no
role in the equilibrium threshold strategy.
Feedback and Stability. Before assessing the performance of the conference, we high-
light the feedback effects that are central to the incentives of activists, and justify our
focus on the signal-responsive equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
An activist’s advocacy will depend upon the threshold rule used by others. As m in-
creases, both his relative likelihood of influencing the party’s chosen policy and his rela-
tive preference for the policies are affected. Inspecting Lemma 1, notice that asm rises (so
that others bias toward B) the relative likelihood falls at rate (piA + piB) ×
√
ψ, so that he
too is led toward policy B. This is positive feedback. On the other hand, Lemma 2 reveals
that, as others bias toward A, his relative preference for A versus B rises at a rate λ; this
negative feedback stems from the activist’s curse. Combining these two effects, we see that
the positive-feedback effect exceeds the negative-feedback effect if and only if
(piA + piB)×
√
ψ > λ.
When this holds, the net effect of a bias amongst other party members is to push an
activist in the same direction. It proves useful to write this criterion in a modified form.
Definition. We define Michels’ Ratio R to be a single index combining the aggregate barriers to
coordination piA + piB, the need for direction λ, and an activist’s sense of direction ψ. It satisfies
R ≡ (piA + piB)×
√
ψ
λ
,
so that positive feedback exceeds negative feedback if and only Michels’ Ratio satisfies R > 1.
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Michels’ Ratio features prominently in the results that follow; the index R is fundamental
to both the feasibility and desirability of leadership and oligarchy.
When R > 1 it seems that a “bandwagon” might form behind a policy. To explore this
hypothesis, consider a situation where piA = piB, so that m∗ = 0. Now suppose that party
members switch to use a lower threshold strategy m < 0, so that they are biased toward
A. When R > 1, this increases the incentive for an activist to back A; in particular, an
activist who observes a messagemi = 0will certainly advocate policy A.
Whilst this may suggest that a bandwagon begins to roll in favor of A, this is not quite
so. To see why, consider an activist who observes a message mi = m. For such a party
member, the relative likelihood term disappears and thus the only factor he will consider
is his relative preference term. Of course, the activist’s curse is integral to this term and
ensures that he now faces a strict incentive to backB. The attempt to enduce a bandwagon
effect in favor of policy A fails, since an activist with a signal equal to this new threshold
will strictly wish to back B. This discussion leads to a formal definition of stability.
Definition. A threshold equilibrium m∗ is stable if: (i) for larger thresholds m > m∗ an activist
with a private signalmi = m would strictly prefer to back policy A; and (ii) for smaller thresholds
m < m∗ an activist with a private signalmi = m would strictly prefer to back policy B.
Given this definition and the discussion above, heuristically at least, the signal-responsive
equilibrium threshold m∗ described in Proposition 1 is stable. In contrast, the equilibria
in which activists pay no attention to the realizations of their private signals are not.
Proposition 2. In a conference environment, the signal-responsive equilibrium (Proposition 1) is
stable. The fully coordinated equilibria in which activists ignore their signals are unstable.
This provides one justification (there are others) for a focus on signal-responsive equi-
libria in a conference environment.12 The important observation here is that the relative
likelihood term depends not just on the threshold m used by others, but on the differ-
ence mi − m between that threshold and the message received by an activist. Put more
crudely, the positive-feedback effect is always eliminated when we consider an activist
whose signal is equal to the threshold used by others and thus, in equilibrium, negative
feedback dominates. Interestingly, the positive-feedback term returns to play a role once
we introduce the possibility (later in the paper) of a publicly observed leader’s speech.
THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP
Michels (1915, pp. 35–41) suggested that the transition from democracy to oligarchy is
driven by a “need for leadership felt by themass.” Here we analyze this need by assessing
the desire of an individual to abandon conference and dictate the party’s policy.
12For instance, one justification is that the responsive equilibrium is optimal ex ante. Prior to the revelation
of their private signals activists would all wish to commit to the play of the signal-responsive equilibrium.
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Guiding the Conference. We begin with this thought experiment: we ask activist l (we
call her a leader) to choose the threshold used by others. She has three options: (a) m =
−∞, so that everyone backs A; (b) m =∞, so that everyone backs B; or (c) some interior
threshold. Options (a) or (b) reflect a desire to lead dictatorially. Option (c) exploits the
information-aggregation properties of a conference but risks a coordination failure; this
choice reflects a desire for leadership to shape policy, but not to dictate it.
Conducting this thought experiment, we write U(m,ml) for the expected payoff enjoyed
by leading activist l when she sees a signalml, when others use a thresholdm, and when
the party is large, so that U(m,ml) is evaluated as n→∞. Hence,
U(m,ml) = Pr[θ > θA]× E[uA(θ) | θ > θA] + Pr[θ < θB]× E[uB(θ) | θ < θB],
where the probabilities and expectations are conditional on ml. Consider a small change
in the threshold. A fall in m shifts the zone of mis-coordination to the left, and so moves
the party away from B and toward A. Formally,
∂U
∂m
< 0 ⇔ log Pr[PA]
Pr[PB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i) relative likelihood
+ log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii) relative conditional preference
+
pi2B − pi2A
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii) feasibility effect
> 0, (†)
where (i) and (ii) are evaluated at their limiting values as n → ∞. These terms are iden-
tical to those that influence advocacy decisions. This is because the fall inm has an effect
only when θ ≈ θA or θ ≈ θB; that is, when activists are pivotal. An increase in the relative
likelihood of PA versus PB leads to a desire to reducem thus increasing the likelihood of
a success for A. The relative preference for A is greater when there is a bias toward B: in
selecting a threshold to be used by others, an activist’s curse remains.
The third term on the right-hand side of (†) is absent from the advocacy criterion of (?).
It measures the difference in the heights of the barriers to coordination. Other activists (if
left to their own devices) favor the ambitious policy objective. Other things equal, activist
l wishes to offset this bias; if piB > piA so that the barrier to coordination on policy A is
lower, the leader would prefer to lower the thresholdm and bias conference toward A.
To see why, note that the number of activists who switch sides following a change in m
depends upon the party mood. Those who switch have signals close to m. If |m − θ| is
large then there are relatively few of these “marginal” activists since they are far from the
median signal of θ. Figure 3 illustrates this effect. From the definitions of θA and θB:
|m− θA| = piA√
ψ
and |m− θB| = piB√
ψ
.
Suppose that piA < piB, so that the barrier to coordination on policy A is lower. When θ =
θA, there are relatively many marginal activists, whereas when θ = θB there are relatively
few. Since more activists switch, following a change inm, when θ = θA compared to when
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This figure illustrates the effect of a reduction in the threshold m when the party
mood hits the critical value θA. The solid line represents the distribution of private
signals across the party membership. A reduction in the threshold fromm tom− ε
increases the mass of activists who back A. This increase is represented by the
shaded area. As θA andmmove further apart, the effect of the ε fall in the threshold
is weakened. The distance between m and θA is piA/
√
ψ, and so a reduction in the
threshold is less effective when the barrier to coordination for policy A is high.
FIGURE 3. Explaining the Feasibility Effect
θ = θB, the pivotal event PA becomes more important than the event PB. This provides
an enhanced incentive to push the thresholdm down and bias party members toward A.
Summarizing, if we delegate the choice of a threshold to a leading activist, she will (other
things equal) bias the choice of threshold toward the policy that is “more feasible” in the
sense that it faces a lower barrier to coordination. Her intervention acts as a counter-
weight to the endogenous bias toward an ambitious goal. However, given the presence
of the term (i) in the criterion (†), she will also wish to move the threshold in the direc-
tion of her own private signal. For instance, if ml > 0 then she may wish to depress the
threshold. If so, then how low will she go?
To answer, suppose that the criterion (†) holds. A reduction inm feeds back into terms (i)
and (ii): the relative likelihood of PA versus PB increases due to positive feedback, whilst
the relative conditional preferences falls due to the negative feedback from the activist’s
curse. (The feasibility effect is unaffected.) When R > 1, the positive effect on (i) is
greater than the negative effect on (ii); since positive feedback exceeds negative feedback
the criterion remains positive and thus the leader faces a further incentive to lower m.
Iterating this logic, she wishes to lowerm all the way tom = −∞. Similarly, if she wishes
to raise m then she wishes to raise it all the way to m = +∞. When R > 1, U(m,ml) is a
quasi-convex or “U-shaped” function ofm, and so the leader would prefer to choose one
of the two extreme values for the threshold. In essence, she would prefer to dictate the
policy of the party and sees no role for a democratic party conference.
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If Michels’ Ratio satisfiesR < 1, so that negative feedback exceeds positive feedback, then
a reduction inmwill lower the criterion of (†). In fact, U(m,ml) is a quasi-concave or “hill-
shaped” function of m. Thus, when R < 1, there is a unique interior threshold m† that
maximizes the leader’s payoff. In essence, she would prefer a situation where, although
she chooses the threshold, conference remains sovereign in that it determines the overall
policy outcome. We summarize our thought experiment in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. If R > 1 then a leader prefers to dictate the party’s policy rather than allow a
conference threshold strategy to operate. If R < 1, then she prefers others to use a threshold:
m† = m∗ − R
1−R ml
wherem∗ is the equilibrium threshold from Proposition 1. This new thresholdm† is decreasing in
her own private signal, and so, relative to the equilibrium threshold, the leader prefers others to
operate a threshold that is biased toward her own private opinion of the party mood.
Proposition 3 suggests that Michels’ Ratio indexes the desirability of leadership. When
R > 1 a leader wishes to push the threshold to an extreme: a desire to dictate party policy.
When R < 1 then, whilst not wishing to dictate, she wishes to guide conference toward a
particular threshold. The extent of the desire to guide is itself indexed byR: asR increases
a leader acts with less restraint in moving the threshold toward an extreme.
The Desire to Lead. The index R brings together three factors which drive a desire to
lead. Michels’ Ratio increases with the aggregate height of the barriers to coordination
and with an activist’s sense of direction, but decreases with the need for direction.
The desire for leadership arises, most directly, when there are high barriers to coordina-
tion, since the zone of mis-coordination (Figure 2) is wide: ensuring that activists work
together is more important than ensuring that the correct policy is chosen.
A willingness to take up the reins of leadership is affected by an activist’s sense of direc-
tion. When ψ is large, she has confidence in her signal and in her ability to lead the party
in the right direction. If ψ is low, it is more prudent to exploit the information-aggregation
properties of the advocacy game, although the desire to guide conference remains.
When ultimate power resides with conference, policy is more likely to be in tune with the
party mood. This is desirable when there is a greater need for policy direction, so that λ
is large. When this is so, leaving control with the conference reduces the risk that a leader
will choose to implement an inferior policy. But, when λ is small, the cost of leading the
party toward an inferior outcome is small also and thus she retains a desire to dictate.
Extremists and Moderates. In our thought experiment we asked what threshold a lead-
ing activist would choose if she could ensure that others would use it. Of course, other
party members will use the equilibrium threshold m∗ rather than a leader’s preferred
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thresholdm†; these thresholds coincide if and only if the leader’s signal is neutral. When
it is not, the leader may prefer to dictate even though R < 1. That is, R > 1 is sufficient to
generate a desire to lead, but not necessary.
When R < 1, some are content with conference, but others, given the opportunity, would
like to lead. A leader with a signal ml = 0 lacks a clear signal of the party mood, and so
is content with the information-aggregation properties of a conference; formallym† = m∗
in this case. She is a moderate with an equivocal assessment of the party’s mood. In
contrast, a leading activist with a very high or very low private signal is an extremistwho
is confident in her assessment and so feels that she is well suited to dictating party policy.
This suggests a taxonomy where only the moderates favor the party conference.
Proposition 4. IfR < 1 then a leading activist is content with conference if and only if |ml| < m˜,
for some m˜ > 0. Otherwise, if |ml| > m˜, she would prefer to dictate by choosing the policy herself.
m˜ rises with the need for direction, but falls with the aggregate height of the barriers to coordination
and the sense of direction. Changing these parameters, m˜→ 0 as R→ 1.
It may seem obvious that an extremist would prefer to dictate. This issue is a little more
subtle, since an extremist can also be confident that a party conference will select the best
policy. After all, she believes that the party mood leans heavily in one direction. Hence
others will also receive strong signals andwill almost certainly coordinate on the policy of
her choice. This argument suggests that an extremist will be almost indifferent between
the two options. Nevertheless, and as the proof of Proposition 4 shows, she is relatively
more confident in her own assessment than in the performance of conference.
Our definition of an extremist differs from common usage: an extremist is a leading ac-
tivist who obtains a strong signal and so has a strong sense of the correct thing to do.
Convinced of her opinions she is loathe to provide conference with a mandate and prefers
to dictate. By contrast, a moderate’s weak signal means that she is happy to allow others
to take their cue from a sovereign democratic institution such as the party conference.
Our taxonomy thus suggests a conflict within a party organization concerning the best
mechanism for achieving policy coordination. This conflict coincides with differing pri-
vate interpretations of the collective interest, and emerges despite the lack of inherent
divergence of preferences in our model specification.
FOLLOWING THE LEADER
We have analyzed an individual’s desire to take a leading role. Following Michels’ (1915,
p. 36) claim that “the renouncement of the exercise of democratic rights is voluntary” we
now assess the willingness of others to follow that lead. An activist attempts to lead by
speaking to conference. When will the membership defer to her message?
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A Leader Speaks. A party member l is chosen at random and makes a stand as leader.
She gives a perfectly communicated speech s = ml describing her views, so that others
commonly observe her assessment of the party’s mood. Hence party members observe a
public signal s of θ, where s | θ ∼ N(θ, [1/ψ]). Activist i’s updated beliefs satisfy
θ | (s,mi) ∼ N
(
s+mi
2
,
1
2ψ
)
.
The expectation of the party mood is an average of a private and public signal, and has
twice its former precision. Importantly, the same public signal is used by all activists, and
so party members begin to share the same perspective on the party’s mood. This shared
perspective is, of course, based on the leader’s speech.
Relative Likelihood and Relative Preference. Once again, activist i supports A if and
only if mi > m for some threshold m. When he considers the likelihood of the pivotal
events PA and PB his beliefs will now be influenced by the public signal.
Lemma 3. Fixing a threshold m used by others, conditional on the private signal mi of activist i
and the speech s of the leader, the log relative likelihood of being pivotal for A versus B satisfies
log
Pr[PA]
Pr[PB] −→
pi2B − pi2A
2
+ 2(piA + piB)
√
ψ ×
(
mi + s
2
−m
)
as n→∞.
This is increasing in the activist’s private assessment of the party mood and the leader’s public
speech expressing her views of the party mood. It is decreasing in the threshold used by others.
In the absence of a leader’s intervention a marginal activist (with a signal realization
of mi = m) is unconcerned by the relative likelihood of the pivotal events; following
Lemma 1, the log relative likelihood term is zero. Inspecting Lemma 3 this is no longer
so when a public signal, in the form of a perfectly communicated leadership speech, is
available: the relative likehood of the pivotal events is influenced by the speech s.
This observation can open the gate to a bandwagon in favor of one of the policies. For
instance, a bandwagon may begin to roll in favor of policy A when party members use a
threshold m < 0. This generates positive feedback via the relative-likelihood effect, and
negative feeback via the relative-preference effect of the activist’s curse. In the absence
of a leader’s speech, the positive-feedback effect disappears. However, once a leader
speaks, positive feedback can accelerate the bandwagon. Of course, the negative feedback
stemming from the activist’s curse (Lemma 2 continues to hold) can slow the bandwagon;
we will consider this issue when we assess the stability of signal-responsive equilibria.
A Threshold Equilibrium with Leadership. A leader would like the party to use her
preferred threshold. For R < 1, this is m† from Proposition 3. We now ask whether the
leader’s speech (a public signal to the party’s membership) helps in the pursuit of her
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aims. We write m∗ for the equilibrium threshold in the absence of a speech and m for a
new equilibrium threshold following the commonly observed public signal.
Proposition 5. Following the observation of the leader’s speech s, there is a unique signal-
responsive threshold equilibrium in which party members use the threshold
m = m∗ −
[
R
1−R
]
s.
If Michels’ Ratio satisfies R < 1, then this signal-responsive equilibrium is stable. Hence if a
leading activist l is able to make a public speech s = ml then the threshold used by others in a
stable equilibrium will be precisely her preferred thresholdm† emerging from Proposition 3.
Hence a leadership speech, which is perfectly communicated to the conference floor, re-
sults in the adoption of a common threshold which is precisely that chosen by the leader.
When the leader announces her signal (she makes the speech s = ml) to the party mem-
bership at large, then other activists know what she knows. Given that they have all in-
formation at the leader’s disposal, and they share her preferences, they act in the way that
she would like them to act. The leader’s original frustration with the conference-based
threshold equilibrium, reflected in the difference m∗ − m†, stemmed from differences of
opinion that, in turn, were caused by different signal realizations.
The Feasibility of Leadership. We recall (Proposition 3) that Michels’ Ratio provides an
index of the desirability of leadership. It also (Proposition 5) indexes the willingness of a
conference to adapt its behavior to a leader’s speech. AsR increases conference responds,
and more so when the leader’s message is strong (so that |s| is large). Since conference
moves its threshold in response to her speech, there is a direct effect of the leader’s inter-
vention on policy: Michel’s Ratio indexes the feasibility of a leader’s influence.
Combined with our previous results, an interesting and yet subtle insight emerges. We
note that, when R < 1, a leader would always wish to guide conference toward the
use of her own preferred threshold m†. When her speech communicates her assessment
perfectly, it is persuasive: it results in the adoption of her desired threshold. An activist
would lead if she could—and she can, since successful leadership is feasible.
Of course, if perfect communication is elusive, then the situation is more complex. Sup-
pose that the leader is unable to explain her views, but is allowed (if she wishes) to inter-
vene and choose the party’s policy. It is in this situation (at least for R < 1) that only an
extremist with a strong signal of the correct thing to do would choose to dictate; following
Proposition 4, a moderate prefers the sovereignty of conference. No such difference arises
when the leader can explain herself: she would always wish to do so and hence ensure
the use of her preferred threshold rule. This extremist-moderate divide arises only when
a clear public speech is impossible. This suggests to us the importance of rhetoric in the
classical sense: a democratic assembly is constrained by the limits of communication.
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Feedback and Stability. We noted that our concept of threshold rules admit fully coordi-
nated equilibria in which activists ignore their signals. In a conference environment, our
focus on signal-responsive equilibria was justified by the stability of the thresholdm∗.
This justification applies to the new threshold m so long as R < 1. To see this consider
a fall in the threshold to m < m, which moves the party from B to A. This increases
the relative likelihood term: a bias toward A is self-reinforcing, putting further upward
pressure on m. However, it also lowers the relative conditional preference for A versus
B: since B is now relatively harder to achieve, activists bias toward it. When R < 1 the
negative-feedback dominates the positive-feedback effect, and thus a marginal increase
in the threshold fails to stimulate full coordination on A.13 Of course, if R > 1 then this
argument fails, shifting focus away from signal-responsive equilibria.
Proposition 6. If Michels’ Ratio satisfies R > 1 then the signal-responsive equilibrium with
thresholdm is unstable, but the fully coordinated equilibria in which activists ignore their signals
(one equilibrium in which everyone backsA, and the other where they all backB) are locally stable.
Here “locally stable” means this: for m < m, an activist with a signal mi = m strictly
prefers to back A, and for m > m an activist mi = m strictly prefers to back B. This
means, for instance, that once a threshold falls below the signal-responsive thresholdm,
and R > 1, there is pressure to drive the party toward full coordination on policy A.
Focal Leadership and Perfect Coordination. Using stability as an equilibrium criterion,
when R > 1 Proposition 6 tells us that we must look toward the two fully coordinated
equilibria in which activists ignore their private assessment of the party mood. But which
of these two equilibria, if any, will the mass adopt?
Following Proposition 3 a leader is delighted to provide a focal resolution to this coordi-
nation problem since she wishes to dictate. For instance, a clear and unambiguous public
announcement that “everyone should backA” is an obvious focal point. Of course, we are
saying nothing new here; many examples of such focal points were suggested in a range
of complete-information coordination games described in the classic work of Schelling
(1960). However, we can offer a further justification. Consider the following speech:
“I stand before you as leader, and say to you that my assessment of the party
mood is s = ml. Based on this, I would like you all to advocate policy A if
and only if your own assessment of the party mood is higher thanm†. Hav-
ing heard my views, but prior to discussing the merits of policy amongst
yourselves, you would all unanimously wish to commit to following my
recommendation. Now that you have formed your own private opinions,
you have no reason to deviate frommy recommendation. Hence you should
13This comparison of positive and negative feedback did not work in a conference environment, since the
relative-likelihood term disappeared when we considered a marginal activist with a signalmi = m.
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follow my advice. Given that you do, I have no reason to mislead you over
my own assessment of the party mood.”
The leader is providing a valid assessment of the party mood based on her signal. She
conveys the reasons for her recommendation, and it is this feature of her appeal which
makes it focal. Were she an outsider, who could not make such an assessment, her speech
would lack focal properties, despite the fact that it is commonly understood. The leader
is simply asking others to do what they would wish to commit themselves to ex ante, and
noting that they have no reason to deviate ex post. Finally, the leader notes that she has no
reason to misrepresent her views. In all, her request for others to follow her is compelling.
Note that the leader need not necessarily make an explicit policy recommendation (al-
though she can) since activists are able to calculate the threshold that theymutually prefer
ex ante based on their common observation of the leader’s public signal. Our argument is
independent of the value taken by R, and leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Suppose that an activist stands as leader, and makes a perfectly communicated
speech describing her views and describing a policy choice. If she does so, then party members
ignore their private information and precisely adopt her recommended policy if and only if R > 1.
Moving beyond the leader’s rhetoric, when R > 1 there are further justifications for uni-
fication behind the leader’s preferred policy. Consider a world in which, prior to the
leader’s speech, activists employ the (stable) thresholdm∗ from Proposition 1. The leader
then speaks, with a speech s > 0 in favor of policyA. This speech will cause an individual
party activist to reappraise positively the relative likelihood of PA versus PB. Given that
others use the thresholdm∗, he now finds it optimal to use a lower thresholdm < m∗.
Of course, an activist might then anticipate that other party members will follow the same
thought process. If he does, then he now expects them to use a lower threshold than
before. Since R > 1, positive feedback exceeds negative feedback, and hence he will find
it optimal to push down his own threshold still further. This heuristic “ficticious play”
exercise continues until full coordination on policy A results.
OLIGARCHY
We have explored situations in which an activist mass hands control to a de facto dictator.
We now consider their response to an organized group (a clique) within their ranks. If
activists ignore their private signals and follow the lead provided by this clique then the
democratic rule by conference is replaced by the rule of an oligarchy.
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The Formation of a Clique. Suppose that a clique of k party activists join together and
share their views, and that k is small enough to allow a mutual understanding to form.
We can imagine a meeting where each member of the clique is able to speak clearly to her
colleagues. They reach a consensus and share common beliefs about the party mood.
Whereas the beliefs of an individual have precision ψ, those of the clique (an average
of their signals) have precision kψ, since they are based on k conditionally independent
signals of the party mood.14 Hence k indexes the sense of direction of the clique relative
to that of an individual. This scenario is equivalent to one in which a leader is better able
to assess policies than other party members. By studying the formation of a clique, we
merely provide a micro-foundation for such a sharpened sense of direction.
Guiding the Conference. Previously, we conducted a thought experiment in which we
asked a leading activist to choose the threshold used by others. She could dictate party
policy, or defer back to conference with her own choice of threshold. From Proposition 3,
she prefers to dictate if and only if R > 1; a leader’s confidence in her own assessment of
the party mood is sufficient for her to abandon conference.
We now conduct this experiment when the k-strong clique of activists have formed a com-
mon view. Since the precision of their shared beliefs is kψ rather than ψ, they have greater
confidence in their ability to do the right thing. The same logic presented in our analysis
of the leader’s thought experiment applies here. However, the key criterion determining
the desire for dictatorial leadership becomes kR > 1 rather than R > 1.
Proposition 8. If kR > 1 then a k-strong clique prefers to dictate policy rather than allow a
conference threshold strategy to operate. If kR < 1, then they prefer others to use a threshold:
m‡ = m∗ − kR
1− kR m¯
where m∗ is the equilibrium threshold from Proposition 1 and where m¯ is the average private
signal amongst the clique. m‡ is decreasing in the clique’s shared assessment of the party mood;
they prefer others to operate a threshold that is biased toward their shared opinion.
Michels’ Ratio continues to drive the desire to lead and the comparative-static properties
of the clique’s preferred threshold precisely match those for the case of a single leader. In
fact, Proposition 3 is a special case of Proposition 8 for k = 1.
We can also extend the extremist-moderate taxonomy of Proposition 4 to a k-strong clique.
Recall that this classification arose when we asked a leader to choose between dictating
policy herself and retaining the equilibrium thresholdm∗ from the party conference.
14Alternatively, we might specify conditional correlation of the clique’s signals. For instance, if the clique
forms from an impromptu meeting in the conference bar, then their signals might be based on similar
information sources, and so might be correlated conditional on the party mood θ. Whereas the average
of their signals continues to provide a sufficient statistic for beliefs about θ, its effective precision is lower.
Thus, when k activists share conditionally correlated signals, the effective size of the clique is lower than k.
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Proposition 9. If kR < 1 then a k-strong clique is content with conference if and only if |m¯| < m˜,
for some m˜ > 0. Otherwise, if |m¯| > m˜, they would prefer to dictate by choosing the policy
themselves. m˜ rises with the need for direction, but falls with the aggregate height of the barriers
to coordination and the sense of direction. Changing these parameters, m˜→ 0 as kR→ 1.
From Elite to Oligarchy. We have assessed the desire of a clique to take a leading role,
and now turn to consider the feasibility of group-based leadership. Suppose that the k-
strong clique becomes an elite: a group of activists who are able to communicate clearly
their views to the party membership. Equivalently, the elite is able to put forward a single
representative who can perfectly express their views s = m¯ by a speech to conference.
Following this speech, activist i’s updated beliefs will satisfy
θ | (s,mi) ∼ N
(
ks+mi
k + 1
,
1
(k + 1)ψ
)
.
He pays more attention to the views of the elite than he does to his own signal. His
perspective is shared by others, enhancing the positive-feedback effect. Unsurprisingly,
positive feedback exceeds negative feedback if and only kR > 1, and this criterion is
central to our final proposition which extends Propositions 5–7 to the case of an elite.
Proposition 10. Following a speech by a k-strong elite, there is a unique signal-responsive equi-
librium in which party members use a threshold m‡. If kR < 1, then this equilibrium is stable.
If kR > 1, then it is unstable, but the fully coordinated equilibria are (locally) stable. Activists
following the advice of the elite will always play a stable equilibrium. They ignore their private
information (they defer to a de facto oligarchy) if and only if kR > 1. Hence 1/R is the minimum
size of a successful Michelsian oligarchy. This size increases with the need for direction λ, but
decreases with the height piA + piB of the barriers to coordination and the sense of direction ψ.
The first element confirms the existence of a stable signal-responsive equilibrium when
kR < 1. The equilibrium threshold m‡ is that preferred by the elite. The wider party
membership is happy to follow the elite’s advice, since this is how they would play if
they could commit ex ante. The elite shapes policy, but conference remains sovereign.15
The second element concerns the case kR > 1 when the signal-responsive equilibrium
(which would involve a bias against the public signal) is no longer stable. Moreover, the
elite would ideally like to see the full coordination of the party on the policy indicated by
their shared view. Such a fully coordinated equilibrium is (locally) stable.
15We have a mind a situation where k > 1, so that an elite has a better sense of direction than an individual.
However, our arguments continue to apply when k < 1. Letting k → 0, the criterion kR < 1will be satisfied
and the (now uninformative) elite’s preferred threshold converges to m∗. Of course, this is the threshold
from the signal-responsive equilibrium described in Proposition 1. This provides further justification for
our focus on the unique signal-responsive equilibrium in a conference environment, since the case k → 0
corresponds to removal of any public information and hence a return to a diffuse public prior belief over θ.
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The third element describes the emergence of an oligarchy. As it was under the leadership
of an individual, the advice of the leading elite is compelling. Prior to the realization
of their private signals, but after listening to the elite’s communication, party members
would unanimously wish to follow the elite’s advice. Thus, even in the absence of an
explicit recommendation, the mass would like to do the elite’s bidding. When kR > 1,
they perfectly coordinate on a single policy and the elite becomes a de facto oligarchy.
The final element of Proposition 10 reveals that the desirability and feasibility of leader-
ship by both individuals and elites are intrinsically linked by the index R.
The Size of Oligarchy. The inverse of Michels’ Ratio provides a lower bound to the size
of Michelsian oligarchy. The precision of the elite’s aggregate signal of the party mood
is increasing in k. An activist mass gives way to the elite only when this precision is
sufficiently high. Adopting a more general interpretation of the parameter k, an elite
becomes an oligarchy so long as its sense direction is sufficiently sharp.
While k > 1/R turns an elite into an oligarchy, further increases in k will enhance the
quality of the elite’s policy recommendations. Given that this is the case, will the elite
grow without bound and incorporate the entire party membership? As it does so, it will
begin to reflect the aggregation properties of the general conference.
The problem which now arises is one of communication. As we noted above, in the ab-
sence of perfect communication a leader will prefer to dictate than to defer back to confer-
ence. An absence of perfect communicationmay also frustrate the efficacy of a larger elite.
When the elite’s membershp is large it may find it difficult to aggregate successfully its
views and communicate a coherent and easily understood message to a wider audience.
This issue may place an upper bound on the feasible size of a Michelsian oligarchy.
TOWARD A THEORY OF LEADERSHIP
Leadership was central to Levi’s (2006, p. 5) “desire to understand what makes for good
governments and how to build them.” In our view a leader’s commonly interpreted as-
sessment of the party mood can provide a focal point for the coordination of an activist
mass. Our analysis thus adds to the literature on the role of institutions in solving coor-
dination problems (Calvert, 1995; Weingast, 1997; Myerson, 2004). We note, however, a
subtle difference between our approach and these precedents. In a world of incomplete
information, leadership is important not just because it provides a common understand-
ing of how the game will be played, but also because it provides payoff-relevant infor-
mation concerning the merits of competing policies. Of course, leadership is not the only
means of providing such information: we have compared leadership to a more demo-
cratic form of information aggregation, namely a stylized party conference.
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In assessing these different institutional forms we were inspired by Michels (1915) who
famously argued that a system of direct democracy would give way to decision-making
by an oligarchic elite. His conceptualization of two mutually incompatible types of inter-
nal governance provides food for further formal analysis which we have provided here.
We have provided micro-foundations for his claim that a “need for leadership” exists in
mass psychology:
”Though it grumbles occasionally, the majority is really delighted to find
persons who will take the trouble to look after its affairs. In the mass, and
even in the organized mass of the labor parties, there is an immense need
for direction and guidance.” (Michels, 1915, p. 38)
In our world, the need for direction, barriers to coordination, and an activist’s sense of
direction combine to give a single measure (Michels’ Ratio) of leadership. It indexes not
only the willingness of activists to modify their behavior in light of a leader’s speech, but
also their willingness to abandon the conference forum altogether and follow a leader’s
prescription; it is a complete index of the feasibility of leadership. Moreover, the desir-
ability of leadership is determined by the same combination of variables.
Echoing Michels’ claim, the need for leadership is felt when barriers to coordination are
high (so that the coordination problem is severe) and when a leader’s sense of direction
is sharp (so that she knows what to do). In contrast, our “need for direction” works in
favor of a party conference: while leadership enhances the clarity of intra-party commu-
nication and so avoids the penalty of mis-coordination, it lessens the response of policy
to the party mood. Our analysis thus contributes to an understanding of the trade-off
between the responsiveness of policy outcomes and concentration of power in the form
of dictatorship or oligarchy, central to the formal analysis of social-choice mechanisms.
Our results are based on a conceptualization of leadership different from that in previous
formal approaches to the subject, which cast leaders in the role of agents under the control
of a legislative body (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989). In those models, a leader possesses skills
necessary to the achievement of collective goals; the gap in expertise between leaders and
followers underlies a common agency problem. An interesting feature of our analysis is
that neither the desirability or the feasibility of leadership depend upon a given skill set
which the leader may possess. Nevertheless, the framework developed here for analyz-
ing the role of leadership could be extended to address this issue. For example, in our
model the establishment of an oligarchy allows individual members of the oligarchy to
pool their information; this, in turn, allows an oligarchy to convey more precise informa-
tion. Of course, individuals differ also in their ability to evaluate information and convey
messages. An extension of our model would allow for an exploration of this and other
individual traits, important to the role of leadership in sustaining coordination.
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Our analysis of the basic coordination problem faced by activists is devoid of factional
conflict: activists share common interests and values but differ in their informed opinions
of the path the party should take. Our approach captures a key element of intra-party
division; that which pertains not to core values, but how best to achieve goals related to
those values; uncertainty over how to achieve goals underpins division, as reflected in our
analysis. Even in our common value game, a degree of factionalism may, nevertheless,
emerge: those with neutral signals are more likely to place their trust in the sovereignty
of conference, whilst those with extreme signals (pointing strongly in favor of a policy
option) are willing to abandon conference as a central democratic institution.
The absence of conflict of interest in our model implies that a leader’s communication
always provides meaningful information; a leader’s rhetoric is not “cheap talk”. Our
results suggest, however, that the clarity of a leader’s communication is also important.
Conference, acting as a central democratic institution, can (in aggregate) correctly assess
the merits of policy, but as a mechanism for communication its performance is poor. A
leader, by contrast, can convey only her private assessment of the party mood, but is able
to do so with clarity. Moreover, the ability of a leader to convey clearly her message is
relevant to institutional choice. For example, when a leader has an extreme signal then,
faced with a choice, she would always wish to guide conference toward the use of her
preferred threshold rather than to dictate; her willingness and ability to do so depends
on her ability to communicate perfectly. Our focus on communication thus contributes
to a broader understanding of different forms of governance, such as democracy and oli-
garchy, which until now have been studied formally only under the guise of commitment
problems with regard to economic redistribution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our results suggest a formal analysis of the role of
rhetoric in effective leadership. Our next step will be to pursue this line of enquiry.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Here we develop a formal model which encompasses the three scenarios (conference, leadership,
and oligarchy) considered in the text, and provide proofs to Lemmas 1– 3 and Propositions 1– 10.
Beliefs. Activist i updates a diffuse prior over θ following signals mi | θ ∼ N (θ, 1/ψ) and s | θ ∼
N (θ, 1/[kψ]). (k = 0 is a conference, k = 1 is a leader, and k > 1 is a k-strong elite.) Conditional
on θ, signals are independent. Updating to form a posterior G(θ | s,mi)with density g(θ | s,mi),
θ | (mi, s) ∼ N
(
ks+mi
k + 1
,
1
(k + 1)ψ
)
⇒ G(θ | s,mi) = Φ
(√
(k + 1)ψ
[
θ − ks+mi
k + 1
])
. (1)
Φ(·) is the distribution function of the standard normal. Now suppose that other activists employ
a threshold strategy. Conditional on θ, an activist backs Awith probability pwhere p = Φ(
√
ψ(θ−
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m)). Writing F (p | s.mi) and f(p | s,mi) for the distribution and density of beliefs about p,
f(p | s,mi) = 1
dp/dθ
× g(θ | s,mi) = g(θ | s,mi)√
ψ × φ(Φ−1(p)) where θ = m+
Φ−1(p)√
ψ
, (2)
and where φ(·) is the density of the standard normal.
Pivotal Probabilities. Fixing activist i, and in a slight abuse of notation, write x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1}
for the number of others who advocateA. Conditional on θ, party members backAwith probabil-
ity p, and hence x is a draw from the binomial with parameters p and n−1. However, p is uncertain
and activist i must take expectations to form Pr[x | s,mi] =
∫ 1
0
(
n−1
x
)
px(1 − p)n−1−xf(p | s,mi) dp .
Activist i is pivotal for the success of A if and only if x ≤ pAn < x+ 1. We write xAn for the unique
value of x that satisfies these inequalities, and note that [xAn /n]→ pA as n→ 0. Clearly,
Pr[PA | s,mi] =
∫ 1
0
(
n− 1
xAn
)
px
A
n (1− p)n−1−xAn f(p | s,mi) dp.
This probability vanishes as n→∞. However, applying Proposition 1 of Chamberlain and Roth-
schild (1981), n × Pr[PA | s,mi] → f(pA | s,mi) and n × Pr[PB | s,mi] −→ f(pB | s,mi) as n → ∞.
This (in essence) is the Law of Large Numbers: when n is large, the proportion supporting policy
converges in probability to p. Hence, pivotal probabilities are determined by beliefs about p via
the density f(p | s,mi). While the probability of being pivotal vanishes with 1/n, an activist cares
not about the absolute probability of being pivotal, but rather the relative likelihood of PA and PB :
lim
n→∞
[
log
Pr[PA | s,mi]
Pr[PB | s,mi]
]
= log
f(pA | s,mi)
f(pB | s,mi) = log
φ(Φ−1(pB))
φ(Φ−1(pA))
+ log
g(θA | s,mi)
g(θB | s,mi)
= log
φ(piB)
φ(piA)
+ log
g(θA | s,mi)
g(θB | s,mi) =
pi2A − pi2B
2
+ log
g(θA | s,mi)
g(θB | s,mi) . (3)
The first equality follows from Chamberlain-Rothschild. The second follows from Equation (2).
The third follows from substitution of piA and piB , and the symmetry of the normal which ensures
that φ(piB) = φ(−piB) and −Φ−1(1− pB) = Φ−1(pB). The fourth follows from substitution into the
standard normal density φ(z) ∝ exp(−z2/2). The notation θA and θB is from the main text, where
θA ≡ m+ Φ
−1(pA)√
ψ
= m+
piA√
ψ
, and θB ≡ m+ Φ
−1(pB)√
ψ
= m− piB√
ψ
,
where the last equality again follows from the symmetry of the standard normal. Taking the
posterior beliefs of activist i from Equation (1) and evaluating at θA, we obtain
g(θA | s,mi) =
√
(k + 1)ψφ
(√
(k + 1)ψ
[
θA − ks+mi
k + 1
])
∝ exp
(
−(k + 1)ψ
2
[
θA − ks+mi
k + 1
]2)
= exp
(
−(k + 1)ψ
2
[
m+
piA√
ψ
− ks+mi
k + 1
]2)
= exp
(
−k + 1
2
[
ψ
(
m− ks+mi
k + 1
)2
+ 2
√
ψpiA
(
m− ks+mi
k + 1
)
+ pi2A
])
, (4)
where for the second step we have applied the formula for the density of the normal, and omit-
ted the multiplicative constant that will be shared with the density g(θB | s,mi). The final two
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equalities follow from substitution of θA and algebraic manipulation. Similarly,
g(θB | s,mi) ∝ exp
(
−k + 1
2
[
ψ
(
m− ks+mi
k + 1
)2
− 2
√
ψpiB
(
m− ks+mi
k + 1
)
+ pi2B
])
. (5)
Combining the expressions from Equations (4) and (5), we obtain
log
g(θA | s,mi)
g(θB | s,mi) = (k + 1)
[
pi2B − pi2A
2
+
√
ψ(piA + piB)
(
ks+mi
k + 1
−m
)]
. (6)
Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (3) we obtain
lim
n→∞
[
log
Pr[PA | s,mi]
Pr[PB | s,mi]
]
=
k[pi2B − pi2A]
2
+ (k + 1)
√
ψ(piA + piB)
(
ks+mi
k + 1
−m
)
. (7)
Conditional Preference. Here we study payoffs conditional on the events PA and PB . Our treat-
ment is informal; a formal analysis is available from us upon request. In a large party, the propor-
tion of activists supporting policy A converges in probability to p. Hence PA occurs if and only if
p ≈ pA, or equivalently θ ≈ θA. So, as n→∞, E[uA(θ) | PA]→ uA(θA) = exp(λθA/2). Hence,
lim
n→∞ log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB] = log
uA(θA)
uB(θB)
=
λ(θA + θB)
2
= λ
[
m+
piA − piB
2
√
ψ
]
. (8)
Proof of Lemmas 1–3. Apply Equations (7) and (8). 
Optimal Advocacy. We now consider the decision of an activist given that the party is large.
lim
n→∞
[
log
Pr[PA]
Pr[PB] + log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB]
]
=
k[pi2B − pi2A]
2
+ (k + 1)
√
ψ(piA + piB)
(
ks+mi
k + 1
−m
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Equation (7)
+ λ
[
m+
piA − piB
2
√
ψ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Equation (8)
= λ
[
k(piB − piA)(piA + piB)
√
ψ
2λ
√
ψ
+ (k + 1)
√
ψ(piA + piB)
λ
(
ks+mi
k + 1
−m
)
+m+
piA − piB
2
√
ψ
]
= λR
[
mi + ks+
(
k − 1
R
)
m∗ −
(
k + 1− 1
R
)
m
]
. (9)
The second equality follows from re-arrangement. The third equality follows from the substitu-
tion of Michels’ Ratio R and m∗ from Proposition 1 and further manipulation. Observe that this
expression is increasing inmi, and hence any optimal strategy (in a large party) is a threshold rule.
Furthermore, when an activist’s signal is equal to the threshold used by others:
mi = m ⇒ lim
n→∞
[
log
Pr[PA]
Pr[PB] + log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB]
]
= λR
[
ks+
(
k − 1
R
)
(m∗ −m)
]
, (10)
which is increasing inm if and only if kR < 1. For a threshold equilibrium, this needs to be zero:
λR
[
ks+
(
k − 1
R
)
(m∗ −m)
]
= 0 ⇔ m = m∗ −
[
Rk
1−Rk
]
s. (11)
When a public signal is absent (k = 0) then the equilibrium threshold ism∗ from the statement of
Proposition 1. If a public signal is in favor of policy A (that is, when s > 0) then the equilibrium
threshold is pushed down so long as Rk < 1. The extent of this effect is increasing in R and k.
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Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Apply Equations (10) and (11) with k = 0. 
Choosing a Threshold. U(m,ml) =
∫ θB
−∞ uB(θ)g(θ |ml) dθ +
∫∞
θA
uA(θ)g(θ |ml) dθ. Recalling that
both θA and θB are linearly increasing inm, differentiate this payoff to obtain
∂U
∂m
= uB(θB)g(θB)− uA(θA)g(θA) < 0 ⇐⇒ log uA(θA)
uB(θB)
+ log
g(θA |ml)
g(θB |ml) > 0
⇐⇒ lim
n→∞
[
log
Pr[PA |ml]
Pr[PB |ml] + log
E[uA(θ) | PA]
E[uB(θ) | PB]
]
+
pi2B − pi2A
2
> 0,
where the final equivalence is from (3). The criterion is (†) from the main text. The sum of the first
two terms (it is the same as (9) settingmi = ml and k = 0) is strictly decreasing inm if R > 1 and
strictly increasing if R < 1. Thus (for the generic case of R 6= 1) there is a unique m† satisfying
∂U/∂m = 0. This must be a local minimum (and hence global minimum, since there is only one
stationary point) if R > 1. Hence, when R > 1, U(m,ml) is maximized by choosing eitherm→∞
orm→ −∞. If R < 1 thenm† yields a global maximum. Explicitly,
∂U
∂m
= 0 ⇔ (piA + piB)
√
ψ(ml −m†)︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Equation (7) with k = 0
+ λ
[
m† +
piA − piB
2
√
ψ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Equation (8)
+
pi2B − pi2A
2
= 0
⇔ m† = piB − piA
2
√
ψ
− (piA + piB)
√
ψml
λ−√ψ(piA + piB)
= m∗ −
[
R
1−R
]
ml, (12)
where the solution form† follows from simple algebraic manipulation.
Proof of Proposition 3. Apply Equation (12). 
Extremists and Moderates. If z ∼ N(µ, σ2) then for real-valued constants b and H > L,∫ H
L
exp(bz) dΦ
(
z − µ
σ
)
= exp
(
bµ+
b2σ2
2
)
×
[
Φ
(
H − µ− bσ2
σ
)
− Φ
(
L− µ− bσ2
σ
)]
. (13)
We can use (13) to calculate a leader’s expected payoff. Suppose that she believes θ ∼ N(µ, σ2).
Write UA = E[uA(θ)] and UB[uB(θ)] for her payoffs when she dictates the adoption of policies A
and B respectively. For UA we set b = λ/2, and for UB we set b = −λ/2. Hence
UA = exp
(
λµ
2
+
λ2σ2
8
)
and UB = exp
(
−λµ
2
+
λ2σ2
8
)
= exp(−λµ)× UA. (14)
UA > UB if and only if µ > 0: a leader implements A if and only if she expects the party mood to
favor it. Next, consider her payoff when others use a thresholdm. Policy A wins if θ > θA, policy
B wins if θ < θB . So, writing I[·] for the indicator function and applying (13),
UC = E
[
exp
(
−λθ
2
)
× I[θ < θB]
]
+ E
[
exp
(
λθ
2
)
× I[θ > θA]
]
= UB × Φ
(
θB − µ
σ
+
λσ
2
)
+ UA ×
[
1− Φ
(
θA − µ
σ
− λσ
2
)]
= UA ×
[
exp(−λµ)× Φ
(
θB − µ
σ
+
λσ
2
)
+Φ
(
µ− θA
σ
+
λσ
2
)]
,
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where the final equality stems from UB = exp(−λµ) × UA and from the symmetry of the normal.
Now, suppose that the leader observes a signalml with precision kψ so that θ |ml ∼ N(ml, [1/kψ]).
Without loss of generality, we setml > 0, so that UA > UB . Now, setting µ = ml and σ2 = 1/kψ,
UC
UA
= exp(−λml)× Φ
(√
kψ(θB −ml) + λ2√kψ
)
+Φ
(√
kψ(ml − θA) + λ2√kψ
)
. (15)
If others adopt a thresholdm∗ then θA = (piA + piB)/2
√
ψ and θB = −(piA + piB)/2
√
ψ. Hence
UC
UA
= exp(−λml)× Φ
(
X −
√
kψml
)
+Φ
(
X +
√
kψml
)
where X ≡ λ(1− kR)
2
√
kψ
=
λ
2
√
kψ
−
√
k(piA + piB)
2
, (16)
following algebraic manipulation. We use this derivation in the next proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a leader with a signal ml > 0. (The case ml < 0 is symmetric.) If
she were to dictate then she would implement policy A and enjoy a payoff of UA. By deferring to
the equilibrium threshold of conference she enjoys a payoff UC . She strictly prefers conference if
UC
UA
> 1 ⇔ exp(−λml)× Φ
(
X −
√
kψml
)
> 1− Φ
(
X +
√
kψml
)
⇔ Y (ml) ≡ log
[
Φ
(
X −√kψml
)
1− Φ (X +√kψml)
]
− λml > 0,
where k = 1 for a single leader. Atml = 0 (a neutral signal) this criterion becomes
UC
UA
> 1 ⇔ log
[
Φ (X)
1− Φ (X)
]
> 0 ⇔ 2Φ(X) > 1 ⇔ X > 0.
This last inequality holds if and only if kR < 1. Since Y (ml) is continuous in ml, there will be
some region of signals close to zero for which the leader strictly prefers to follow conference. In
fact, there exists a unique critical private signal m˜ such that (for positive signals) Y (ml) > 0 if and
only if ml < m˜. The proof follows from the claim that Y (ml) is strictly decreasing in ml with a
derivative that is bounded away from zero. To prove this claim, first write
Y (ml) = log
[
1− Φ (√kψml −X)
1− Φ (√kψml +X)
]
− λml.
Next differentiate to obtain
Y ′(ml) =
√
kψ
[
φ(
√
kψml +X)
1− Φ(√kψml +X)
− φ(
√
kψml −X)
1− Φ(√kψml −X)
]
− λ
=
√
lψ
[
h(
√
kψml +X)− h(
√
kψml −X)
]
− λ,
where h(z) ≡ φ(z)/[1−Φ(z)] is the hazard rate of the standard normal. Applying the mean-value
theorem, there is some z satisfying
√
kψml +X > z >
√
kψml −X such that
Y ′(ml) = 2
√
kψXh′(z)− λ = λ(1− kR)h′(z)− λ,
where the second equality follows from the definition of X in (16). Now, the hazard h(z) of the
standard normal is an increasing and convex function of its argument, and is asymptotically linear,
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so that h(z)− z → 0 as z →∞, and hence h′(z) ≤ 1 for all z. Hence, for kR < 1,
Y ′(ml) ≤ λ(1− kR)− λ = −λkR < 0.
Thus Y (ml) is strictly decreasing in ml, and the derivative is bounded away from zero. Hence
Y (ml) < 0 forml sufficiently large, and there is a unique m˜ such that Y (m˜) = 0. 
Proof of Propositions 5 and 6. Apply Equations (10) and (11) with k = 1. 
Proof of Propostion 7. From the argument given in the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 8. With an average signal of m¯, a k-strong clique’s beliefs about the θ are, mod-
ifying (1) appropriately, captured by the density g(θ | m¯) = √kψφ(√kψ(θ − m¯)) where φ(·) is the
density of the standard normal. Following derivations analogous to those leading up to (6),
log
g(θA | m¯)
g(θB | m¯) = k
[
pi2B − pi2A
2
+
√
ψ(piA + piB)(m¯−m)
]
. (17)
The clique’s expected payoff U(m, m¯) is locally decreasing inm (so that they favor a shift toward
policy A) if and only if g(θA | m¯)uA(θA) > g(θB | m¯)uB(θB), or, upon substitution,
log
g(θA | m¯)
g(θB | m¯) +log
uA(θA)
uB(θB)
= k
[
pi2B − pi2A
2
+
√
ψ(piA + piB)(m¯−m)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Equation (17)
+λ
[
m+
piA − piB
2
√
ψ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from Equation (8)
> 0. (18)
The left-hand side of this inequality is strictly decreasing in m (implying that U(m, m¯) is quasi-
convex in m) if and only if kR > 1. So, if kR > 1, the clique prefers to dictate policy. For kR < 1,
setting the expression in (18) to zero and solving form yieldsm‡. 
Proof of Propostion 9. For general k, the proof of Proposition 4 applies. 
Proof of Propostion 10. The first and second claims follow from an application of Equations (10)
and (11)for general k, giving a solution for the equilibrium threshold equal to m‡. The remaining
claims follow by inspection or from the arguments given in the main text. 
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